Explores how continental philosophy can inform environmental ethics.

The paper is a response to Adam Daniel Rotfeld’s essay, “Shaping a New International System for the Twenty First Century”. Rotfeld’s essay offers provocative insights to current world affairs while asking timely questions. In the following pages I respond to a few of the large and important ideas Rotfeld raises. I do not attempt to engage in a direct dialogue with the details or justifications of Rotfeld’s analysis but rather explore some of his insights in new directions. I do argue (...) that while neoliberalism has emerged as a candidate for a new ideology of globalization it is likely to fail in that quest. Instead, I argue that any new ideological framework for a new world order must emerge through a bottom-up dialogue that includes previously silenced voices. I argue that the zone of conflict between the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern worlds is also a zone of creativity. (shrink)

Part One of this paper defends biocentricism, the view that all life has intrinsic value, against the charge of ecofascism. I argue that theocentric and anthropocentric worldviews are structured by a logic of domination that the radical egalitarianism of the biocentric world does not generate. In Part Two I sketch the foundations of a philosophical anthropology that unites a phenomenological understanding of human existence with a Darwinian view of human nature. The understanding of moral experience generated by this philosophical anthropology (...) moves away from a metaphysical interpretation of intrinsic value toward an experiential account of moral phenomena. (shrink)

This paper argues that the pluralist ethos of today’s world requires dialogue, i.e., the construction of shared meaning through a plurality of perspectives. This, in turn, requires that partners in dialogue overcome the perspective of the “master self” who claims universal legislative authority in its quest for epistemic closure. Dialogue requires the cultivation and development of a dialogical self-identity that reflects the ability to co-construct shared meaning without the erasure or suppression of differences.

This paper explores the contribution that a Husserlian inspired phenomenology can make to environmental philosophy. In particular I argue that Husserl’s phenomenological critique of naturalism liberates thinking from its metaphysical naïveté thereby opening thought to a new conception of nature, while his theory of intentionality can be adapted to provide new directions for developing an account of axiological rationality which is open to claim that there is goodness and value within non-human nature. Such a form of rationality, based in the (...) dialectic of empty and filled intentions, would begin to provide a discourse in which the goodness and value of non-human nature could be registered, expressed, and articulated in a rational manner. The result will be an experiential grounding for environmental ethics. (shrink)